Maxims:

MALCOLM'S MAXIMS:

Grandtac	Cavalry	combined
Artillery	Infantry	overall

Grand Tactical Maxims:

I	A commander should develop the practise of always asking himself: If the enemy should suddenly present himself to my front, my right, or my left, what would I do? What troops could I muster for battle? What would be the implications and route of retreat?
II	Likewise, he should look at his positions and say "How could the enemy most inconvenience or damage my position?" and act to minimize the risks.
III	Like a chessboard, the commander should analyze the campaign map, studying the potential threats and opportunities of key points, their characteristics, and vulnerabilities. Also, make note of potential combinations, ie in the East, Reims was key as a major road connection between Laon and Chalons. Is it defensible though if the enemy occupies Epernay? In fact, it becomes a liability and may become a place to become trapped. Therefore there is no point in giving up Epernay in order to protect Reims. If forced to choose between one or the other, the choice should be for Epernay.
IV	For every position, real or hypothetical, a commander should confirm what he will allow the enemy to hold, in what strength, and confirm what he himself must hold in order to maintain that position. He must always keep in mind the roads, bridges, fortifications, and lines of communications.
V	For a battle, do not spare a single musket or saber. One brigade can decide the day so gather anything available.
VI	It is best to receive an attack where you are ready for it. Therefore, it is worst to launch any attack where an enemy is ready/expecting it.
VII	The art of strategic manoeuvre is to influence an enemy to attack in places where he cannot win. This is the idea behind cutting communications and outflanking. It incites an isolated enemy to attack/fight disadvantaged.

Tactical Maxims:

Artillery:

VIII	The role of heavy artillery is to provide a fire base to support an attack or fall back onto. Its strength is its range. Its weakness is its maneuverability and the time it takes to deploy.
IX	The role of light (horse) artillery is to go forward with an attack, act as a mobile reserve, or rear guard.
X	The only occasion where mass guns are to be employed is when a critical space of 2" needs maximum fire, there is no other way to get fire into that point, and it is fairly safe from enemy counter-battery.
XI	If well supported by cavalry, a commander should spread his guns. Otherwise they are too susceptible to attack.
XII	Just as it is a bad practise to commit all infantry and cavalry to the front line, an artillery reserve should be maintained. This should consist mostly of light guns so that they can be maneuvered quickly to a point of decision. This is often the hardest reserve to maintain (due to the intuitive desire to maximize forward firepower) but could be the most valuable if properly committed. Keep in mind that an artillery reserve will, unlike infantry and cavalry, require an hour or more to deploy properly.
XIII	Counter-battery fire should be employed when the enemy's guns represent more of a threat to your battle than your guns do to his.

Cavalry:

XIV	The role of cavalry is to react to neutralize or counter his opponent's opportunities or to exploit his own. It is not to charge enemy cavalry that gets within range.
XV	Always recall that 2:1 odds with cavalry ( in other words, using to brigades to fight where one can) is only a +1 on the combat resolution. The only time that a second unit being added to an attack is worthwhile is when trying to change the modifying unit.
XVI	Cavalry, opposed to strictly cavalry, should deploy in line while cavalry opposed to, or in support of infantry (ie, in an infantry environment) should be deployed in variations of columns and lines in order to take advantage of narrow paths of advance.
XVII	Always leave 2" between cavalry formations front-to-rear to allow minimum bounce distance or follow up.
XVIII	With cavalry, division commanders should not be attached if reacting/acting with a multiple brigade divisions toward combat. Instead, they should remain in the reformation area. If reacting in maneuver, commanders need to be attached.
XIX	Never advance with cavalry without first planning a route/bounce path. The same applies to all cavalry deployment to a lesser extent.
XX	The commander who best maintains control of his cavalry and maximizes the advantages of reaction will win a mass cavalry battle. By biding one's time and always waiting for and being ready for opportunities, the commander who is responsive and careful will defeat the commander who is aggressive and leading individual brigades from the front.

Infantry:

XXI	Always leave 2-3" minimum between infantry formations front-rear to allow for possible combat withdrawals. Similarly, an infantry column should always have enough room on each flank to allow it to deploy from column to line as required.
XXII	If a firefight is sustainable, take the time to form line. Only if it is not, or speed is the prime concern, should a combat be attempted in column. Infantry columns are not an arm of decision but rather maneuver. For decision, use infantry lines, cavalry, or arty. If , on the other hand, a win in column can be fairly guaranteed and there is no serious counter-attack threat, it would be the preferred formation for attack since the unit would be properly deployed to take advantage of any gained breakthroughs.
XXIII	The addition of multiple infantry units into a melee mostly just provides more opportunities to get a good result. With two units, there will be two rounds at least. Therefore do not commit multiple units to a bad or excellent situation but only where the issue is in doubt and a win is more decisive than a loss or two.

Combined arms:

XXIV	It is a wing commander's role to fully coordinate all the tactical arms in a sector for attack and defense.
XXV	When attacking, ask yourself what you hope to accomplish and then what you will do if you achieve that. If you cannot take advantage of a victory then do not attack.
XXVI	In defense, recall that you do not defend ground. You defend situations and endeavor to control opportunities. Ground is a tool toward this but it is neither a mark of success nor is it the goal. Similarly, do not attack for the sake of taking ground. Attack to create opportunities and only if you have the means of taking advantage of them.

Overall Command:

XXVII	It is dangerous to think of the attack/defense as an on-off switch. It is more dangerous to allow your commanders to think of it that way or to expect it from you. I find it safer to use terms like 'apply pressure', 'tie up forces to your front', and ‘maintain your offensive capability while exhausting your opponent's'. If you tell a commander to 'attack' or 'defend' the terms become like psychological anchors.
XXVIII	Generals will tend to forget the plan upon making contact with the enemy as they become immersed in the task of seeking opportunities. This quest for opportunities should not be discouraged but it becomes imperative therefore that the commander must continually reinforce, reiterate, and re-emphasize the plan to these generals throughout the day.
XXIX	Remember that the greatest tool that you have for controlling a general is his ego.
XXX	Do not expect that an all-out attack along an entire sector can turn a situation around. More likely than not it will just aggravate the current troubles. The all-out attack, like hand-to-hand combat, is going to be decisive and sometimes it is best to not look for a decision at that point in the battle. Think of the all-out attack more as a 'coup de gras' than as a desperate countermeasure to pressure. Firstly, it should be done only when your opponent has committed his last reserves and is on the point of breaking anyway. The point is to make it a decisive snap that he cannot recover from with all of your reserves being committed to follow up the attack. Therefore if it fails, you have no reserve left and are left with your pants around your ankles. Secondly it needs an hour or so of coordination and movement to ensure that everything is positioned perfectly to take advantage of the successes and to be able to minimize the damage of your failures. To ensure that you have that hour, you cannot rely on messages and either everyone is given the timing for it before the battle starts or by word of mouth during the battle. In either case, you really must be able to see where and when it will go in 2 hours before it is to start. Consider how you will cancel such an all-out attack if this becomes necessary.
XXXI	It is said that the army which first commits their last reserves will lose. In my experience this has always been fairly true. One goal of a commander then must surely be to force their opponent to commit his last reserves while maintaining his own.
XXXII	If you assign yourself the goal of destroying your opponent's brigades, you are making the same mistake as an amateur chess player who seeks to take every piece presented to him. You should instead seek to destroy your opponent’s willingness to fight. More games are won by getting your opponent to concede than by completely breaking his army morale.